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ABSTRACT
One of the important function! of the Primary Beat Tramport System
(PRTS) of a large Liquid Metal Feet Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) plant ia to con-
tain the circulating radioactive sodium in component* and piping routed
through inerted area? within the containment building. A significant po»«-
ible failure made of thf* vital aystem ii the development of erackii in the
piping component*. Thii paper presents reault* from the probabilistic as-
seaiment of postulated flav* in the noit critical piping elbow of each pip-
ing leg. The criticality of calculated maximum sized flaw* i* a*se**ed
againct an estimated material fracture toughne** to determine safety factor*
and failure probability estimates uting stress-*trength interference theory.
Subsequently, a different approach i* alio employed in which the randome**
of the initial flaw aize and loading are nore-rigorou*ly taken into ac-
count. Thi* latter approach yield* much (mailer probability of failure val-
ue* when compared to the itresc-strength interference analyaif result*.
INTRODUCTION
Layout of the PBTS piping and component* of a typical large LMFBR plant
i* shown in Figure 1. Loop arrangement i* ba*ed on an "elevated loop" con-
cept to provide protection against Ion of coolant in the event of a »odium
boundary failure in one of the loops. The FHTS perform* the heat transport
function* for all normal and certain abnormal mode* of reactor operation.
Thr primary system hot leg piping from the reactor vessel outlet to the
primary pump inlet in this atudy is nominally 36 in (91.4 cm) outside dia-
meter by 0.5 in (1.27 cm) wall thickness. The remaining hot leg (crossover
lsg) piping from the pump discharge to the intermediate heat exchanger (IHX)
inlet is 32 in (81.3 cm) outside diameter by 0.5 in (1.27 cm) wall thick-
ness. The cold leg piping froa the IEX to the reactor vestel islet nozxle
is also 32 in (81.3 cm) outside diameter by 0.5 in (1.27 cm) wall thick-
nest. The hot and crossover leg piping is type 316 stainless steel (SS) end
has a normal operating temperature of 950°F (510°C). The cold leg
piping consists of type 304 SS and has a normal operating temoerature of
670C-F (354°C).
The piping it comprised of straight pipe runt mnd curved pipei and el-
bowi, vhich are uaed for change* in direction of the piping syatea. The
loopa and bend* in the wuncontal piping runa provide the required flexibil-
ity to accommodate the thermal expansion of the system. Design, fabrica-
tion, and testing of the PHTS piping eomponenta, vhich comprise the aoditaa
boundary, conform to Section III of the ASMS Boiler and Preaaure Veaael Code
III.
The Boat significant possible failure and* at the PHTS piping ia the
Conation of significant cracks due to flaw propagation, reaulting in large
leakage or rupture of a piping leg. There are alvaya acne flava which are
significant and cannot be detected. A flaw with depth one-fourth the vail
thickness, t, ia initially choaen at a realistically conservative value
aince such a depth ratio findt contideration in Appendix C of Section III of
the ASME Code, though it ia not atrictly applicable to thia work. An ini-
tial flav length of 3t it choaen to assure that the major effect of crack
length ia included, and surface defects are postulated aince they are more
aevere Chan similar sized internal defecta.
The fracture mechanics techniques used in this study and the analytical
reaults are first josnarized. Detailed structural reliability methods are
then applied to illustrate an approach for the demonstration of inherent
piping safety and reliability againat the above postulated failure mode for
a family of flaw sizes.
FATIGUE-CRACK GROWTH ANALYSIS METHODS AND RESULTS
This section presents a crack grovth evaluation of piping legs of the
Typical PHTS. The objective of this analyaia ia to aaaeaa the potential
grovth of cracks, which are postulated to exist in the worst locations and
orientationa of the piping system under study, due to cyclic fatigue. The
PHTS piping atress analyaia reaults indicate that the elbow locationa are
the most highly stressed areaa of the syatem. The thin wall of LMFBR PHTS
piping results in elbow stress indices (multipliers) being on the order of 4
to 5 tines greater than the respective values for light water reactor cool-
ant loop piping. Therefore, the piping elbows become the critical locationa
in the primary system rather than the weld joints aa reported for light
water reactor piping crack growth atudiea [2].
The linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM) approach for calculating
fatigue crack growth under cyclic loading is used [3]. The methodology em-
ployed in the evaluation is that detailed in Reference [4] and ia briefly
sunnarized below.
The approach uaed in thia study ia baaed on the well documented fact
chat the rate of cyclic crack growth (da/dN) ia a function of the history of
the effective stress intensity factor!at the crack tip. The crack growth
rate relation considered to be applicable ia [5):
where
*eff
R • K . IT. , K and K . are the maximum and minimum magnitudes of the
stress intensity tactor during a load cycle, and "m" is an experimentally
verified factor to account for '-rets ratio effects. The function Co«
(Keff)
n ia experimentally determined in the laboratory using conven-
tional precracked specimens of the material of intereat to define the
1 The term "stress intensity factor", at uaed in the context of LEFM, mutt
be distinguished from the same term, used in design requirements of the ASMS
Boiler and Freaaure Vessel Code. At used here, the stress intensity factor
• ~_i« a characterization of the theoretical stress singularity predicted to
exist at the tip of a crack in a perfectly elastic body under load.
fatigue-crack propagation behavior. The materials of the piping system un-
der study have been extensively investigsted to characterise the effect of
various reactor operating conditions upon the rate of fatigue-crack growth.
The crack growth rate curve applicable for a temperatura range of M l < t <
1,000°? (3i7° 5 T S 538°C) as gives is Figure 3 of Reference [4] is chosea~
for the fliiw propagation analysis.
Th* cracks considered are assumed to be two-dimensional semi-elliptical
surface flnws as shown in Figure 2. Siace the crack geometry can be felly
described by two dimensions, only growth in the depth direction (a) and in
the length direction (2c) needs to be considered presuming self-similar
growth. Therefore, stress intensity factors at points A and C (Figure 2)
are required. Both membrane tension and linear bending loads arc considered
in the region of the crack. The equations for the stress intensity factors
at points A. and C on the crack front are expressed in the form:
I.A - Ofc /vm f^ (a/c, a/t) + ffB /5a g^ (a/c, a/t)
max max nax
Kc » o. /5a f_ (a/c, a/t) • a /5a" g. (a/c, a/t)
max max max
K. - o. /wa f. («/c, a/t) • a /ST g. (a/c, a/t)
tain Bin A "min. *
K- - o. /5a f. (s/c, a/t) • a /HI g., (a/c, a/t) _
Cmin bmin C "ain °
e Oh . . and c_ . . are the maximum/niniimim linear bending in£
r»nt f^hfife componintff'of stress a:cing transverse to the plane of Khe
wher
neob a
crack. The plate thickness (or pipe wall) is expressed as t. The influence
of crack shipe (a/c) and relative crack depth (a/t) are expressed through the
f(a/c,a/t) and g(a/c,a/t) functions for the banding and teosile load condi-
tions respectively as related in Ref. [4].
The stress intensity factors defined in equations (3) along with the
f(a/c, a/t) and g(a/c, a/t) function* are generated from solutions obtained
for flat plites. Curvature correction factors to these solutions for'cylin-
drical shells are available. However, these factors are insignificant at
crack depthi less than seventy per cent of the wall thickness for piping com-
ponents with dimensions similar to the FHTS pipe dimension* under study [6].
The effect of curvature is therefore not considered in the calculations since
extensive end-of-life flaws did not develop.
Appropriate stress values, which include the critical losd combinations
and stress histograms for key selected duty cycle events, are input to the
above fracture relationships along with the postulated initial defect (l/4t
'deep, 3t in length) to determine the crack growth amounts in the most severely
loaded elbovs of each piping leg. (An example of a load evznt stress histo-
gram is given in Table 1 of Reference [4]). The stresses are applied to
axially oriented flaws on the inside and outside surfaces of each elbow.
Referring to Figure 2, the tensile meabrsne snd bending stresses are superim-
posed in the hoop direction and act transverse to the plane of the crack,
which is nonzal to the pipe (plate) surface. The axial stresses, being much
less than the" corresponding hoop stress values, are ignored in the analysis.
Inside snd outside surface flaws sre evaluated becsuse of the different oper-
."ating environments and the reverr_l in thermal transient stresses.
Applying the stress cycles in a conservative and representative manner,
'the crack propagation analyses yielded the following results:
o The defeeta do not grow extensively during the load hiatory for any
of the caaea studied. afi Mi • 1.13 ^initial
 f o r t h c hi«he»t
caas.
o The smallest crack growth occurs in the piping leg without preaaura
loadings.
o The outside surface cracks propagate significantly further than thc
inaide aurface cracks for each of the three piping leg elbowa
studied. The assumption of an aggressive air environment rather than
the actual relatively inert nitrogen atmosphere for the outside sur-
face cracka ia the main reason for thia phenomenon.
o Host of the crack extension, although small, occurs during either low
cycle/high atreaa aeismic events or high cycle/low atreaa load caaca
for all six crack situations. Additionally, the maximum applied
atreaa intensity valuea in each crack situation are related to aeia-
mic eventa. Thia domination by earthquake loadinga becomes important
in the reliability assessment portion of the study.
SAFETY AND RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT
The criticality of the above calculated maximum aired flawa are now aa-
aessed againat eatinated material fracture toughness valuea to determine the
factora of aafety and probabilitiea of failure for the PBTS piping lega. Al-
though crack propagation itaelf does not constitute failure, it ia considered
ao in thia aafety and reliability assessnent in an indirect manner. Flaw
growth proceeda to failure if either the critical stress intensity, the criti-
cal flaw aire, or the critical number of life cyclea associated with the flaw
ia reached. In the above crack propagation analyses the worst loading event
is applied to the maximum crack size, which grows to this configuration from
application of the other significant duty cycle events during plant life, to
- obtain the maximum atreas intenaity for each crack aituation studied. These
maximum stress intensity values rather than the critical flaw aizes or life
cycle valuea are used in the safety and reliability calculation since the lat-
ter parameters cannot be readily determined. The maximum stress intensity
values range from 23.8 kai /in' for the most severly loaded cold leg elbow to
35.2 kai /in" for the critical hot leg elbow.
Critical caterial toughness valuea are determined prior to comparing them
againat the maximum applied atress intensities. Stress-strength interference
-theory is initially applied to estimate the failure probabilitiea. Subse-
quently, a more elaborate procedure is employed which includes several random
variables in the determination of failure probability valuea.
Critical Toughness Determination
Becauae of the high toughness to yield atrength ratio for annealed typea
304 and 316 SS, the critical value of toughness, K. , cannot be determined
from LEFM testing. The test specimen would have to be immenae to meet the
LEFH teating requirements. Therefore, K, must be determined from J_ ,
the critical value of Rice's J-Integral 17], resulting from elastic plastic
fracture mechanics teating (8}.
The toughness data reported for the materials and operating temperatures
of interest are cparae and most of them exhibit a aignificant degree of scat-
ter. These characteristics are depicted by the toughness data for annealed
type 304 SS base metal given in Figure 3 [9]. The acatter in the date are due
to the fact that the results are generated for dirferent product forms, speci-
men configurations, and testing and data reduction techniques. This scatter
could be narroved by deleting some of the data on the basia of a recommended
procedure for "valid" J- toughnesa testing. However, this would further
reduce the small quantify of available data. While available J_ »aluea for
304 SS are not entirely satisfactory, there seems to be no meansCoi improving
the data at thia time.
Reference 9 reports that toughness data for the 316 SS are more sparse
than the 304 SS data, are scattered, and do not even border on the temperature
ranges of the hot and crossover leg piping. However, a comparison of the
~J. valuea for typea 304 and 316 material, aa shown in Figure 3, ahowc
316 SS to h u e a touchheaa approximately the same or (lightly higher than the
304 SS value* at the same respective temperatures. Therefore, it is .lssumed
that the safety factor and probability of failure calculations can be carried
out using 304 SS toughness data for 316 Material even at temperatures higher
than 600°r (315°C). This should be conservative particularly if the lower
booad 304 ES toughness values are used.
legarding the temperature* of interest, all of the data shown ia Figure 3
arc eelow the 950°F (S10°C) normal operating temperature of the hot and cross-
over legs. An appropriate extrapolation of the available J values is nec-
essary, but the actual toughness trend is not obvious because of the scarcity
and scatter of the data. Nevertheless, the available higher temperature J.
values are assumed to be applicable at the 950°F (510°C) temperature.
The five data points in Figure 3 at temperatures from 752°F to 830°F for
the hot/crossover leg evaluation span a vide range of toughness values. The
naximum value is nearly twice as large as any other value in the data set and
lies veil outside the range of the other four test results. Since this result
appears to be an overly optimistic eitimate of material toughness, it is
eliminated from use in the calculation. Therefore, the nean values of
toughness are estimated to be 1,928 in-lb/in and 217.5 ksi r^1 (241 HPa^T)
for Jj. and Kj e, respectively. (Plane strain testing conditions have been
assumed in the general relationship between J and K, .)
AT'for the cold leg (670°F, 354°C), test data at temperatures trdm~6'd0°F to
752°F in Figure 3 are employed in the calculation. The range in toughness
values is judged to be reasonable. J_ » 1,830 in-lb/in2 and H, - 219 ksi' in'
(243 KPa /a) are the estimated mean vilues of toughness.
Factor of Safety Calculation
The factor of safety is calculated using the following relationship:
Factor of Safety - =5£ (4)
TttX
APPLIED
Inputting the maximum applied stress intensities from each crack analyzed
and the above determined critical values of toughness into equation 4, the
factors of safety are calculated to range from 6.2 to 9.2, which are very high
values for the three piping leg elbows studied. Eovever, these margins of
safety against crack induced failure are probably optimistic considering the
vide scstter in the material toughness data. The following probability of
failure calculation takes this dispersion of data into accouat.
Probability of Failure Calculation Using Stress-Strength Interference Analysis
The oaxinum applied and critical stress intensities are now treated as
random variables in the probsbility of failure calculation. In order to apply
the stress-strength interference theory, the probability distribution func-
tions of these random variables are required.
A statistical analysis of the data [10] yields the coefficient of vari-
ation of the fracture toughness for the hot/crossover and cold leg piping to
be 0.32 and 0.25, respectively. The median values are 217.5 ksi «£n and
219 ksi >£iT, respectively. The fracture toughness values were then plotted on
normal, log normal, and Weibull probability paper to determine if the data
fit any of these common statistical distributions. The J. and K. values for
either hot/crossover or cold leg materials do not fit veil against any of the
above distributions as shown in Figures 4 through 6. Since no apparent method
exists for improving the toughness data, the normal distribution is assumed
for the interference analysis. Though neither toughneaa parameter fitted bet-
ter than the other for any of the distribution*, I. valuea are uaed rather
than J. Taluea for convenience.
The variability of the •aximm applied atreaa intenaity ia a function of
flaw aize and plant loading (tranaienta, earthquake accelerationa, etc.) dia-
tributiona. Since it ia not poaaible to derive quantitatively the applied
atreaa intenaity diatribution given the fact that the diatributiona of sone of
theae input parametera are unavailable, a normal diatribution ia aaauaed.
Reference 11 ahowa that the upper tail probabilities of aeveral common statis-
tical models (for example, log nonaal, Veibull, ganaa, exponential) having the
name Mean, )t, and standard deviation, Oi are bounded froa above by the upper
tail probabilitiea of the noraal diatribution with the atandard deviation
doubled. Distributions are plotted in Reference 11 for coefficienta of
variation, — , equal to 0.10 and 0.25 for the common statistical models
atudied. Since the coefficient of variation for the applied stress intensity
ia estimated to lie within the 0.10 to 0.35 range, a doubling of the
coefficient of variation to 0.50 is judged to be an adequately conservative
measure for calculating the probability of failure using stresa-strength
interference theory.
When the strength (K_ ) and stress (Is..- »PPTTTT>' *re normally dis-
tributed, the failure probability (Q) is EivenbyJTb],
Q - $(Z) (5)
.where J (•) is the standard Guassian cumulative function, and Z ia the stan-
dardised normal variate.
Z i= *KAX APPLIED (6)
2 +
KIC "KAX APPLIED
where V fa and V fa are the aean/standard
deviations of the critical and maximum appliea stress intensities, respec-
tively. The I (•) values for different Z values may be obtained from standard
trxts; for exsaple, Table A-l of Ref.[lOlt
Using the critical stress intensity data discussed earlier and the maxi-
mum applied stress intensities, coincident with a coefficient of variation
equal to 0.50, the probabilities of failure per year for the PBTS piping are
determined to range from 5.2 x 10~& to 1.4 x 10~*. Theae probabilitiea of
crack induced failure for the three piping leg elbows atudied are significant.
However, the actual failure probabilities should be much leaf if the randoa
variability of all the parameters involved are considered.
Since the maximum applied stress intensities resulting from seismic
events dominate the risk, a more detailed procedure is now employed in the
following section to consider the flaw aizes, stresses due to earthquakes, and
critical stress intensity valuea as random variables. This latter approach
yields much smaller probability of failure values when compared to the above
stress-strength-interference analysis results.
It should be mentioned that the unreliabilities are quite insensitive to
the coefficient of variation for the maximum arMied stress intensity becauae
of the wide scatter in critical toughness values (see equation 6). This also
proves to be true in the more detailed analysis.
A - w : r- TVt,;i_.-
Probability of Failure Determination Psin« an Alternate Approach
Earthquake loadings are deteradned to in the dominating events froa the
crack propajation analyais resulta. Therefore, the probabilistic part can be
carried out us follows. Let P.. be the probability that a • a. and c • c.
Utj " 1» 2, ...) to generate a''family of several representative flaws, tet Q^
be the probability of an earthquake that eatise* bending and •enbrane stresses
o. « o_ and a • o . (k " V, 2 . . . ) . Using the stress intensity relationship*
given in equations V$), it is possible to calculate values K. with
a.t c , a.., a . and similarly K_ , etc. Since it is essential to
1 j OK sue «»« i A k
consider the critical stress intensity,'K' , as a random variable, let
r£( 6*1,2, ...) be the probability that K. ia less than or equal to the largest
value of X. , Kp , etc.' for each flaw and earthquake intensity
'max, i,j,k Cmax, i,j,k
level studied. The final failure probabilty estimate in the critical elbow of
each piping leg is:
?f " i j k I '« Qk Tl <?)
Distributions for the critical stress intensity values for the PETS pip-
ing materials are given in the previous section. These normal distributions
are used in the r» probability determination (determination of r£ is
discussed in detail in the numerical calculations). Initial flaw size and
earthquake probability distributions are generated below. Following these
determinations, the failure probability estimates are calculated for the moat
highly stressed elbow in each piping leg and results are presented and dis-
cussed.
Initial Maxicum Flaw Site Probability Distribution. The initial flaw
size density distribution in a piping component after inspection should he
directly related to the maximum flaw size density prior to inspection and to
the probability of non-detection for the various inspection techniques em-
ployed. The nature of the required data is the initial flaw distribution
prior to inspection and the statistical reliability of the applied non-des-
tructive examination (NDE) methods. Ideally, both distributions should be a
function of bivariate crack size distribution. Since relevant applicable data
essentially do not exist for this case, initial flaw size probabilities are
developed based upon a univariate approach, the crack depth.
Even for the univariate case, a lack of data using actual surveys exists
at this time on both flaw characterization in netals and the reliability of
KDE methods for the materials of prime interest. Summel, et. al.t [12} and
Lemon [13] have performed work in this area on aluminum aircraft structural
components to enhance aerospace technology. The reliability of NDE techniques
are quantified in Il2 ] and statistical concepts are presented in (13) to pre-
dict the in-sexvice flaw *Lzc density distribution after inspection. Soae
parts of these studies are useful for the definition of defects and are em-
ployed in this PHTS piping reliability assessment.
. The work by Lemon [13] centers on the determination of the initial in-
service flaw distribution as a function of the reliability of the inspection
techniques and the flaw size distribution prior to inspection. Lemon's devel-
opment utilizes order statistic* (that is, all flaws in a part are ordered by
size froa the smallest to the largest) and the most useful result is the deri-
vation of the relationship of the maximum flaw size distribution after inspec-
tion-with-part-rejection to the maximum flaw size distribution prior to in-
spection. Often it is the case that only the largest flaws are known after
inspection.
- • The probabilistic method derived by Lemon [13] has been used to calculate
the maximum flaw size cumulative distribution for 0.5 in (1.27 cm) thick pip-
ing. The following assumptions were made:
1. Flaw* in > part occur independently of one another.
2. The flaw sice i» unrelated to the nunber of flavi in a part.
3. There are fewer flava of larger sizes in a part and many flaws of
•nailer sizes.
4. The probability denaity function of tbc initial flaw depth distribu-
tion ia exponential.
5. The probability of having • flaw of depth 0.1 m or greater ia 0.9.
6. The flaw sice of 3 percent or less of pipe wall thickness has a prob-
ability of detection of 0.0.
7. The probability of detecting a flaw depth in excess of 17 percent of
the pipe vail thickness is no better than 0.997.
Assumption 3 was based on results of Krsvchenko and Tursunov [141. The
exponential distribution of flaw sizes was previously used in an analysis by
Becher and Pedersen [15], where it was stated that a flaw of 0.1 mm depth
would "ooit certainly exist". Therefore, the probability of exceeding this
flsw depth was taken to be 0.9 as given in assumption S. Assumption 7 was
based on results of HUE compiled by Holt [16].
As described by Lemon [13], the initial in-service flaw density function
can be determined if the initial flaw size (depth) distribution and the proba-
bility of detection for the various KDE techniques are known. The flaw size
depth distribution f(x) was derived using the above considerations in assump-
tions 1 through 5 and is given by:
f(X> - 27.02e -27.02X o<x<m (8)
"where X is the flaw depth. The reliability of the combined NDE techniques was
derived from the conditions noted in assumptions 6 and 7. The resulting prob-
ability of detection, P^, as a function of flaw depth X, was determined using
a linear relationship between the limiting flew depths in assumptions 6 and 7.
Lemon's expression for the distribution of the maximum flaw depth after
inspection with part rejection is:
FM (x|l, Xg) " /* K M .Ij A£ • Bi • C. for o < X < Xg (9)
where:
X " flaw depth
I • inspection procedure
X- " rejection threshold - predetermined value for which a
part is rejected if a flaw is found during inspection of
depth equal to or greater than this value
I > a normalization constant
M - initial number of flaws per part
*H ^ I f X B ' " m*x"mjIB flaw depth cumulative distribution after
inspection-with-part-rejection and rejection threshold x_
A. - probability that the i-th deepest flaw has a depth x
B. - probability that the i-th deepest flaw escapes detection
1 given that it has depth x
_" '.- C. » probability that the depth-ordered flaws i + 1 to K are
. V x detected and that each has depth less than Xe given
the i-th depth-ordered flaw has depth x
' - In the analysis, jj - » is assuoed. That is, all detected flaw,, are
removed, but no parts are rejected. The maximum flaw size cumulative
distribution is calculated as a function of the nuaber of flsvs, H. Results
-are. given in Figure 7 for M«l to M-10 for 0.5 in (1.27 cm) thick p'iping.
' •' Ai M increases in Figure 7, the range of the distribution improves; and
- for sufficiently large values of H, the graphical representations should
coincide. Therefore, the distribution for H • 10 ia cboaen for the present
work.
Table 1 fives approximate values of tbe post-inspection probabilities of
existence for tea chosen flaw depths for the reliability asseasaent. These
values represent the flaw probability densities at discrete intervals in the
doaaia of the cumulative probability distribution given ia Figure 7. Since
tbe fracture mechanics relationships for the stress intensity factor
calculation uses a two-dimensional crack geometry, the flaw length sMst also
be included to complete a representative family of flaws. For each flaw depth
(«j) given in Table 1, flaw lengths (c.) equal to 10 x a., 5 z a., and 1 x a.
are con \dered aaaigning tbe sane probability o£ exittence to all three craei
shapes (long semi-elliptical to seai-circular). A value equal Co 1/3 of the
respective flav depth probability is arbitrarily assigned to each of the*e
flaws. This representation yields a family of 30 flaws spanning a wide range
of configurations for the probabilistic analysis of the critical piping elbow
in each piping leg.
Earthquake Probability Distribution. A feasible spectrum of earthquake
probabilities a* a function of intensity and geographic location is determined
in this section for use in the PUTS piping probsbility of failure calculation.
Hsieh, et. al.t [17] have presented the probability of various levels of
earthquake-induced ground accelerations for the Eastern United Statea (Figure
8); these probabilities have been used in the Reactor Safety Study [18].
For the present study, the ground acceleration values directly associated
with the membrane and bending stresses induced by the operating basis
earthquake (OBE) and safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) events are 0.15g and 0.30g
respectively. From Figure 8 the annual probabilities associated with these
seismic events are 1.2 x 10~3 and 1.9 x 10"*, respectively for an Eastern
United States plant aite location. To obtain conservative values for a
Western United States site location, the Eastern U.S. probabilities are
increased by a factor of 3 [17]. The resulting earthquake probabilities used
in the present work become 3.6 x 10~3/year for the OBE and 5.7 x 10~Vyear
for the SSE.
Numerical Calculations and Discussion of Results. For the three PHTS
piping elbows under study, calculations are carried out to estimate the
probabilities of crack induced failure from the application of two different
earthquake intensities to a representative family of initial flaw size*. Only
one analysis is required for the criticsl elbow in each piping leg since the
seismic stresses and material toughness values are similar (in the analysis)
for both the inside and outside piping elbow surfaces.
Using the above generated data, a farily of wide ranging defect sises (*j,
c. where i - 1, ..„, 10 and j » 1, ..., 3) with associated probabilities, P..,
are incorporated into the numerical computation along with the maximum seismic
membrane and bending stresses (o , >°hv where k - 1, 2) with related
probabilities, Q.. This input yieTis 60 ffaw/earthquake combinations to be
evaluated for each elbow. Maximum stress intensity values at the points of
maximum depth and length on the crack front are determined by inputting these
60 sets of values into equations (3). The largest value of K^ and Kg
for each of the 60 cases is selected to be K where I - 1,5?X... 60.""
f!AX.
The probabilities associated with these values are defined as follows:
P. • P.. Q where i,j,k have 10, 3, and 2 values respectively (10)
XJ * and thus I has 60.
Probabilities r, associated with K, exceeding the normally distributed
material toughness parameter K I c aredetermined using the standardized





V - aeon value of K_
a • standard deviation of K
r , is given by,
r, - i(x,) (12)
where } (•) is the standard Gaussian cumulative function.
Finally, the failure probability estimate for the critical elbow in each
piping leg is generated by:
Pp - Z P^ Tt (13)
vhich is equivalent to Equation (7).
Failure probability estimates are summarized in Table 2 for the most
critical elbow in each PHTS piping leg for the largest flaw/earthquake
combinations and the cumulation of the entire family of representative defects
and earthquakes studied. Results from the stress-strength interference
analysis are also repeated. The main points of discussion from the analytical
results ara:
o The annual failure probabilities in Table 2 for the largest flaw/
earthquake combination using the alternate approach show an improve-
ment of about 5 orders of magnitude over the respective values calcu-
lated using stress-strength interference theory. The JL - 0.3/£."
10,0 flaw/SSE loading ccfbination clearly envelopes anf crack aud
loading conditions evaluated in the previous analyses. Thus, use of
the more rigorous alternate approach does significantly improve those
values obtained by the interference analysis method.
o Long semi-elliptical flaws show higher failure probability estimates
than semi-circular flaws, verifying that long shallow surface defects
are more severe than semi-circular flaws.
- ' o The failure probabilities for the mid-range defects (0.08 < ~t <
0.015) in combination with the lower earthquake intensities are the
major contributors to the cumulative failure estimate for each
elbow. This result occurs because of the high flaw probability den-
sity generated for the mid-range cracks, the high probability of oc-
currence defined for the OBE, and the wide distribution in material
toughness. Although the results from the alternate approach yield
nore accurate and reiiucod failure probabilities, the cumulative val-
. ' ". ues for each elbow are still fairly high from a structural reliabil-
ity viewpoint. Additional vork should be carried out to improve the
initial flaw characterization for the materials of interest, to im-
prove the seismic spectrum representation and, most importantly, to
". ' investigate the use of a different failure criterion in an attempt to
•'• ' further reduce the values. The use of the material flow stress rule
'_-•• is a possibility for a failure criterion.
.;• V.AS'ER
The flow stress criterion checks failure caused by the remaining
uncraeked pipe cross-section being unable to support the applied
loads. That is, pipe severance is assumed to be a result of net
section plsstic instability, which occurs when the net section stress
(which can be determined using finite eleaent analysis methods)
exceeds the average Material flow stress. The flow stress is
generally taken as halfway between the yield and ultinate strengths
to estimate the effects of strain hardening in the very ductile,
tough auitenitic stainless steel piping aaterials of interest.
The flow stress is probably a aore representative failure criterion
than the material toughness parameter, Jj c (Kic). Assuming
failure u a result of exceeding Jjc is probably overly
connervative since the material! of interest do not fail in a brittle
as represented by use of Chis parameter.
The numerical rusultt of the current work should not be taken as final
since they are provided mainly to illu«trate the technique. Discretization of
continuous variables introduces errors that have not been quantitatively
estimated in this application. For example, the representation of the seismic
event spectrum by only two ground acceleration values may not be satisfactory.
However, a refined spectrum is not expected to change results by orders sf
nagnitude.
COHCLDSIOHS
Initial semi-elliptical surface flaws are postulated to exist on the
inside and outside surfaces of the most highly stressed elbov in each FHTS
piping leg of a typical large UIFBR plant. These defects do not grow
extensively under application of stress histograms conservatively representicg
the load history for defined key umbrella plant duty cycle r-.cati. Although
crack propagation itself does not constitute failure, the meximum applied
stress intensities associated with each defect are the important factors in
the safety and reliability assessment.
The maximum applied stress intensities from the flaw growth analyses ere
compared against estimated critical material toughness values. High factors
of safety were directly calculated, but marginal failure probabilities were
determined using stress-strength interference theory because of the vide
scatter in the measured critical toughness values. *
Since the maximum applied stress intensities are shown to result froa
'seismic events, a more detailed procedure considering the flaw sizes, the
stresses due to earthquake, and the critical stress intensity values as random
variables was employed. The respective failure probabilities from the
interference analysis were improved by about 5 orders of magnitude for each
elbov studied. In this detailed probabilistic assessment a representative
family of initial flav sizes spanning minute semi-circular defects to long
' deep semi-elliptical cracks was studied in conjunction with two earthquake
levels of intensity (OBE and SSE). The failure probabilities for the
mid-range defects in combination with the lower earthquake intensity (OBE)
were major contributors to the cumulative failure probabilities for each
elbow, rather than the large defect/large earthquake combination. The more
accurate cumulative results for each elbow from the alternate approach are
still fairly significant mostly due to the wide distribution in material
toughness. In order to further reduce the values, additional work is
recommended for improving the initial flaw characterization and the seismic
spectrum representation and for investigating the use of a different fracture
criterion (e.g., material flow stress rule). No means of improving current
fracture toughness data seem to exist for the materials and temperatures of
interest.
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TABU 1























Note: For each flaw depth (a^), flaw length! (e.) equal to 10 z a.,
5x«£, and lxa- are considered assigning the >ame probability of
existence, P../3, to all three crack shapes.
TABLE 2
PHTS CRITICAL PIPING ELBOW

























Notes: (a) Largest flaw dimensions are: £ - 0.3, - • 10.0 and the
largest earthquake is the SSE. ^^^
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Figure 1. Typical PHTS Piping Layout
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Figure 2. Surface-Cracked Plate Subjected to Bending and Tension, with Detail of Cndc Geometry ._
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Figure 5. Cumulative Occurrence of Critical TouglinetH J k and K|c - Log
Normal Di.ilribiition(l ln-Lb/lnz "0.175 K)/m2 , ! KsiVTii •
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Figure 6. Cumulative Occurrence of Critical Toughness J^ and Kgc - Weiball
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